I study the pollution control problem faced by an imperfectly informed supranational governmental authority (SNGA) that wishes to design an international environmental agreement (lEA) for developing countries (DC). The SNGA cannot contract directly with polluting firms in the various DCs; it must deal with such firms through their national governments. Further, owing to national sovereignty, the SNGA is unable to either monitor the actions of DC governments and firms or enforce the terms of the lEA in the event of a contractual breach. In this setting, I study the properties of equitable lEAs in which similar DCs are held to similar environmental standards. In particular, I focus on two cases. In the first case, governments and firms within individual DCs do not collude among themselves, and, in the second case, they do. I show that when the private information of firms and governments across the two DCs is perfectly correlated, whether or not there is collusion, the SNGA can always implement the full information lEA in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. My analysis tells us that (i) the significance of the monitoring and enforcement problem in such international settings has been exaggerated, and (ii) the technological similarities between DCs have a far greater bearing on the design problem than do the potentially deleterious effects of sovereignty. Indeed, there are a number of situations in which Pareto-efficient lEAs can be designed by the SNGA.
Introduction
With the passage of time, it has increasingly been recognized that environmental protection is a global issue. As noted by Bernauer (1995 , p. 354) , the scope and significance of this issue have been amply demonstrated by the events of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio. At this Summit, it became clear that if the northern nations of the world wanted " ... the environment to be secured for future generations, [then they would] have to radically assist the South in choosing a different road to development than the one they [had] currently [been] traveling on" (Rogers 1993, p. 27) . Indeed, to combat the evils of poverty and environmental degradation, developing countries (Des) have demanded the transfer of resources and technology from developed countries. In such a contentious setting, the success or failure to protect the environment will depend crucially on the ability of international institutions to design effective international environmental agreements (lEAs)? Given this, a key question becomes "How can international institutions, which necessarily respect the principle of state sovereignty, contribute to the solution of difficult global problems?" (Keohane, Haas, and Levy, 1993, p. 6) . This is the central question that I propose to study in this paper.
On the academic front, only very recently have researchers begun to systematically study issues relating to global environmental protection. As a result, many specific questions remain unanswered. What kinds of contracts must a supranational governmental authority (SNGA) design in order to get sovereign nations to voluntarily participate in lEAs in a noncooperative environment?
How is the lEA design question affected by the fact that the SNGA must deal with national governments directly and polluting firms only indirectly? Are there circumstances in which the SNGA can require that pollution be abated at the first-best level? Finally, given that the SNGA is unable to monitor pollution abatement activities in sovereign nations, what steps can it take to mitigate the effects of potential collusion between governments and firms in individual nations?3
These are the specific questions that I shall address in this paper.
Although my analysis is, in principle, applicable to any country, the hierarchical interaction that I shall analyze is particularly relevant to DCs. Consequently, the reader should note that it is these countries that I have in mind in the rest of this paper.4 In particular, I shall study the interaction of the SNGA with governments and firms in two DCs. The SNGA designs lEAs in which two technologically similar DCs are held to contractually similar environmental standards. This notion of technological similarity is formalized by having: (i) the private information of the two polluting firms, i.e. , the random quality component of the abatement technologies; and (ii) the private information of national governments, i.e., the results of monitoring undertaken by the two governments, be perfectly correlated. The reader should not interpret this perfect correlation formalization literally. Given DC demands for the transfer of resources and technology from the developed world, my purpose here is to study the properties of lEAs which are equitable in the sense that they hold similar DCs to similar contractually specified environmental standards. The perfect correlation formalization is an abstraction to this end. 3 As we shall see, circumstances will arise in which governments and flrms within individual Des will want to collude to maximize the monetary transfers to be received from the SNGA.
4The countries I have in mind are those which would be eligible to receive monetary transfers under the Global Environmental Facility's standard of$4,000 or less. For more on this, see Rogers (1993 , p. 155) .
My principal result is that when the private information of firms and governments in the two DCs is very similar, i.e., perfectly correlated, regardless of whether there is collusion between governments and firms in the individual countries, the SNGA can always implement the first-best lEA in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. I now discuss the connections between my model and some of the related literature concerning lEAs.
Environmental Protection, Agency Theory, and the Economics of Hierarchies
Barrett (1994), Black, Levi, and de Meza (1993) , Hoel (1992) , and Sandler and Sargent (1995) have all studied different aspects of lEAs. Barrett has observed that for lEAs to be successful, they need to be self-enforcing. Black, Levi, and de Meza have determined the minimum number of countries needed to make an lEA viable. Hoel has studied the properties of lEAs, which require that pollutants be abated uniformly. Finally, Sandler and Sargent have shown that the success of lEAs depends on how individual pollution activities add to the total level of pollution experienced by nations. While these papers have certainly advanced our knowledge of some aspects of" ... the multi-faceted design ... problem" (Black, Levi, and de Meza, 1993, p. 281) , a number of other important questions, which I discussed in section 1, remain unanswered. Consequently, I
now discuss my theoretical approach to the lEA design problem.
In the multi agent contract theory literature, Sappington and Demski (1983, hereafter SD) and Demski and Sappington (1984, hereafter DS) have analyzed two-tiered hierarchies with one principal and two agents. DS assume that the private information of the agents, across the two agents, is positively but imperfectly correlated. SD assume that this information is perfectly correlated. SD / 4
show that in an environment with perfect correlation, the principal can always implement the first best contract in dominant strategies. I shall extend the SD analysis by adding a third tier, and then I shall study the properties of the lEAs that the SNGA can implement in a three-tiered hierarchy.
Three-tiered hierarchies with one principal, one intermediary, and one agent have been studied by Tirole (1986 Tirole ( , 1988 , Kofman and Lawarree (1993) , and by Batabyal (1996a Batabyal ( , 1996b Batabyal ( , 1996c .5 In these papers, the focus is on analyzing a hierarchy with a single "fork." I shall extend this research by adding a second "fork" to the underlying hierarchy. In other words, my task will be to study a two-forked, three-tiered hierarchy. Occupying the top tier of the hierarchy is the relevant international institution or SNGA. This SNGA could be an organization such as the World Bank in its role as an administrator of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) or the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) created in Agenda 21 at the Rio Earth Summit. The second and third tiers of the hierarchy consist of the national government and a representative polluting firm in each of the two DCs. 6 The rationale for the actual contracting stems from issues including, but not limited to, the harmful effects of nitrogen and/or sulphur emissions. The incidence of pollution may be domestic or trans boundary .
7
The uncertainty in my model stems from the SNGA's lack of knowledge about the quality of the pollution abatement technology/capability available in each of the two DCs. Whereas the 5The Kofman and Lawarree (1993) paper actually has two intermediaries-an external and an internal auditor.
6The reader will note that in this modeling scheme, I have conferred on the SNGA the role of principal. As a result, there is a distinct asymmetry in the assumed power ofthe SNGA as opposed to that of governments and fIrms. Given that I am interested in DCs who typically have limited bargaining power in their interactions with international organizations owing to the fact that their monetary contributions to the budgets of such organizations are minimal, this hierarchical modeling scheme appears to be appropriate. For more on the power of SNGAs over DCs, see Mosley, Harrigan and Toye (1991) .
7See Crane (1993) or Paarlberg (1993) for a discussion of the relevance of international institutions when the incidence of an environmental externality is domestic. polluting firm in each country always knows the quality of its technology and the government does too in some states of nature, the SNGA is never privy to this information. As indicated previously, the random variable denoting the private information about pollution abatement technology quality is perfectly correlated across the two DCs. From the standpoint of pollution abatement, this means that both countries are technologically very similar. The reader should think of sets of countries, such as Ecuador and Peru, China, and the Philippines, or South Korea and Taiwan, which are technologically very similar. The SNGA's task is to design an incentive compatible, in section 5 collusion-proof as well, lEA, which (i) is equitable in the sense that similar DCs are held to similar environmental standards, and (ii) will lead to optimal pollution abatement. To the best of my knowledge, this problem of designing lEAs for very similar DCs in a hierarchical framework has not been studied before.
The reasons for wanting to study collusion between the polluting firm and the DC government are threefold. First, while the DC government participates in the lEA because it recognizes the value of appearing "green," this government also acts as the polluting firm's advocate.
This aspect of the problem will give rise to scenarios in which government/firm collusion becomes a desirable option.
8 Second, the government and the firm in each country receive monetary transfers for their roles in abating pollution. Further, both these players in each DC know that the SNGA cannot monitor their activities owing to sovereignty, or for that matter, enforce the terms of the lEA in the event of a contractual breach. Consequently, there will be circumstances in which there are incentives for the government and the firm to collude to maximize the transfers received from the 8See Peterson (1993) for a discussion of some practical instances of possible government/firm collusion in an international setting.
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SNGA. Third, as Mookherjee and Png (1995) and others have noted, corruption is an endemic part of public life in many DCs. This suggests a need for explicitly modeling the actions of potentially corruptible agents. Due to these reasons, an important part of this paper will consist of analyzing collusion-proof contracts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 3, I describe my model in detail, and then I characterize the properties of the first-best lEA. In section 4, I study the above-described three-tiered hierarchy with no collusion by firms and governments in the two DCs. In section 5, I study the case of collusion by the government and the representative firm in each DC. In section 6, I conclude and offer some suggestions for future research.
The Theoretical Framework

3a. Description of the Model
Superscripts A and B will denote the two countries, and subscripts i = 1, 2, 3,4 will refer to the state of nature. In what follows, I shall focus on country A; the analysis is analogous for country B. The risk-averse polluting firm in A produces clean air, whose output and value are denoted by x A, X A 2 o. The polluting firm in A chooses a level of abatement a A > 0 , and this firm's cost of abatement is (a A )2/2.9 This firm has a strictly concave and differentiable payoff from
. Ti1 2 0 is the monetary transfer made by the SNGA to the A firm when it produces clean air x/ and the B firm produces 9The use of this functional form is without loss of generality. All the results of this paper can be obtained by using a general, increasing, and strictly convex abatement cost function. ./ V AR and GAR are common knowledge. The reader should note that making reporting a key government function is consistent with the government/SNGA interaction proposed for one specific SNGA, namely, the Commission on Sustainable Development. As noted by Rogers (1993, p. 310 Alternately put, the pollution abatement technology can be of low quality, e AL , or of high quality,
The SNGA is risk neutral and it has a welfare function defined over clean air, which takes 
In state 1, firms and governments in both countries observe that the quality of the abatement technology is low. In this state, the two-government monitoring mechanisms function and hence they provide useful information. In state 2, both firms learn that the abatement technology quality
IOThe reader may be wondering about the source of these transfers. One possibility would be to conform to the Rio Earth Summit document known as Agenda 21. According to this document, developed countries are supposed to contribute 0.7% of their GNP for the purpose of environmental protection. For more details, see Rogers (1993, pp. 151-60) . I have discussed issues related to the SNGA ' s budget, and contracting with budget balance constraints in Batabyal (1996b) . is low, but the two governments learn nothing. In this state, the two-government monitoring mechanisms malfunction. In state 3, the two firms learn that the abatement technology quality is high and the two governments learn nothing. Once again, the two-government monitoring mechanisms malfunction. Finally in state 4, firms and governments in both countries learn that the abatement technology quality is high. The two-government monitoring mechanisms function effectively in this state. I I I shall assume that PI > P2 and that P4 > P3. In other words, the two monitoring mechanisms are reliable in the sense that they are more likely to function than to fail.
The timing of the game between the SNGA, theA government, and theA firm is as follows.
First, the SNGA offers the contract to the government and to the firm inA. Second, the firm learns In the remainder of this paper, I shall assume that the SNGA can verify the veracity of the government report y4 . In other words, if the government signal sA is noninformative, then the corresponding report y4 reflects this fact and the SNGA can verify that the true facts are indeed as they have been reported. In symbols, SA = oA ==> r A = OA . On the other hand, to keep the SNGA's design problem interesting and to allow for the possibility of government/firm collusion, I shall permit the government to lie and report that its signal is noninformative when in fact such is not the I II have assumed that the governments always know when their monitoring devices malfunction. More involved formulations in which the governments do not know the states in which their monitoring devices have malfunctioned are possible. These alternate formulations require additional constraints on the SNGA's problem, and they make it very difficult to obtain concrete results. We see that in a first-best optimum, the marginal cost of pollution abatement, the LHS of (1 b), is set equal to the marginal welfare from abatement. The optimal level of abatement a *A equals unity in all four states of nature. The firm receives a transfer for abating pollution, which is independent of the state of nature. This transfer equals [TAR = B -I (BAR) + 1/2], where 1/2 is the cost of pollution abatement in the first-best optimum. I can now define this first-best optimum.
Definition: In the first-best optimum, (i) the government and the firm in each country are held to their reservation utility and payoff, respectively, (ii) equation (1 b) holds, and (iii) the equilibrium contract is Pareto efficient in every state.
12The reader will note that I have restricted the government's message space in certain states. Specifically, the government can lie only in states 1 and 4. The government can also report the wrong state, but in my model, making such a report is equivalent to obtaining a non in formative signal. While in principle this restriction can be relaxed by allowing for an expanded range of governmental reporting options, from a practical standpoint, such an action would make it very difficult to obtain concrete results. This is because relaxing the above restriction would lead to an increased number of states and hence to more constraints on the SNGA's overall maximization problem.
I now discuss the more interesting cases in which the SNGA cannot determine the quality of the abatement technology, or the actual abatement undertaken by the A firm.
The No GovernmentlFirm Collusion Case
In this section, I shall disallow the possibility of collusion between the government and the fum in A. When the A government is paid its reservation transfer GAR, it receives its reservation utility VAl?, and hence it is fully insured. Furthermore, since I am not allowing for the possibility of government/firm collusion and because the SNGA can verify the government's report by paying GAR, the SNGA can obtain the A government's information at least cost. In terms of the design of the main contract, this means that the three-tiered hierarchy effectively reduces to a two-tiered hierarchy in which the A government plays a completely passive role. (iv) the pollution abatement levels satisfy a/ = a*A = 1, Vi, (v) the transfers to the firm satisfy TI1 = T2~ = T3~ = T4~' (vi) the contract is Pareto efficient in every state, and (vii) the two "out-of-equilibrium" transfers satisfy T2~ < T3~ + ~eA {(~eA/2) -I}, and
In this setting, the SNGA solves
Proof' See the Appendix.
Comparing Theorem 1 with the definition of the first-best optimum in section 3b, it is easy to verify that the contract described in Theorem 1 does indeed implement the first best. Theorem 1 describes the level and pattern of pollution abatement that one may expect to observe in my stylized two-country setting in which the SNGA does not know the quality of the polluting firm's abatement technology, and it must design an optimal lEA, which takes account of the organizational hierarchy.
Since the SNGA acquires the government's information in states 1 and 4 and because this information is verifiable, the firm can be required to abate pollution at the first-best level. The optimal contract then specifies equal monetary rewards to the firm in each of these two states.
A A Hence, Til = T 44 · On the other hand, when the state is 2 or 3, the SNGA's information is imperfect. This notwithstanding, Theorem 1 tells us that because: (i) the random variables denoting quality, OA and OB, in A and Band (ii) the government signals st and SB are perfectly correlated, the SNGA can exploit this fact to require that pollution be abated at the first-best level in states 2 and 3 as well.
Consequently, the monetary transfers to the firm are identical in all four states, 1.e.,
Intuitively, we can think of the SNGA placing the two polluting firms in a Prisoner' s Dilemma game in states 2 and 3. By designing the out-of-equilibrium transfers so that they satisfy the inequalities given in Theorem 1, the SNGA ensures that abating at the "correct" level is the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The results contained in Theorem 1 depend on the perfect correlation of (i) the government signals, and (ii) the random variables denoting abatement technology quality in the two countries. The reader can verify for himself that the first-best lEA can also be implemented by the SNGA in a dominant strategy equilibrium.
At and since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, there has been considerable discussion about the properties of politically acceptable and economically feasible lEAs. In particular, given DC perspectives on the nature and causes of global environmental degradation, the equity aspect of lEAs has become an important issue. \3 We have seen that as long as governments and firms in individual DCs do not collude, a SNGA which cares about world pollution can use the technological similarity 13For more on this, see Bernauer (1995) , Keohane, Haas, and Levy (1993) , and Rogers (1993). ofDCs to design an lEA which is equitable and which mimics the first-best lEA. The designed lEA is equitable in the sense that technologically very similar DCs are held to identical pollution abatement standards and the transfers made to the relevant parties in the two countries are also very similar. Moreover, this lEA, described in Theorem 1, mimics the first-best lEA because it satisfies the requirements of the definition of the first-best optimum given in section 3b.
Thus far, we have seen that it is certainly possible to design equitable lEAs; such equitable lEAs hold groups of similar DCs to similar environmental standards. Consequently, such lEAs and the monetary transfers that come with participation in these lEAs should be politically acceptable to DCs. However, given the incentives for government/firm collusion in the individual DCs, there is some question as to the robustness of these equitable lEAs. I now explore this robustness issue by studying the design of collusion-proof lEAs.
The GovernmentlFirm Collusion Case
Recall that, because of national sovereignty, the SN GA is unable to monitor the actions of governments and firms in A and B or enforce the terms of the lEA in the event of a contractual breach. Since the SNGA can never acquire the firm's private information and because it must rely on the government's report r4 to design the optimal contract, it is of considerable interest to determine the nature of the optimal lEA that can be implemented by the SNGA when the government and the firm in each of the two countries collude to maximize the total transfers to be received from the SNGA. Collusion by the firm and the government in each country alters the incentives of the various parties but not, as we shall see, the properties of the optimal lEA designed by the SNGA. To see why the firm inA might want to bribe its government, consider state 4. In this state, the government is indifferent between reporting that it has observed 8 AH and reporting that it has observed OA. The firm, on the other hand, would prefer that the government report OA. This is one instance in which a clear rationale exists for the firm to bribe its government. 14 In order to formulate and solve the SNGA's problem when there is collusion, I shall follow Tirole (1986 Tirole ( , 1988 and Batabyal (1996b Batabyal ( , 1996c .15 This method involves the imposition of constraints in addition to the usual participation and incentive compatibility constraints. These additional constraints are designed to preclude government/firm collusion and hence make the main contract collusion proof. The reader should note that in this section I am considering simultaneous collusion in both countries. The optimal lEA designed by the SNGA for A is collusion proof on the 14See footnote 8 as well.
15For a somewhat different approach to modeling collusion, see Kofman and Lawarree (1993) .
assumption that, if the resulting lEAs were not constrained to be collusion proof, government/firm coalitions would form in both DCs. The reader will note that this assumption of "simultaneous collusion" is weaker than the assumption which requires that the contract for A be collusion proof, 
Constraint (3 b) is the government's participation constraint. Constraint (3 c) tells us that the government should not be able to bribe the firm to lie in state 2 and abate pollution at the level appropriate for state 3. Similarly, constraint (3d) tells us that the government should not be able to bribe the firm to abate pollution in state 3 at the level appropriate for state 2. Constraints (3e) and
16The collusion-proof transfers are denoted by G .. and T.. , respectively.
II II / (3f) are the core collusion constraints. The purpose of these two constraints is to make the solution to the SNGA's problem collusion proof. Recall that in states 1 and 4, the government's signal ~ about the firm's abatement technology quality is informative. Thus, in these two states, the government can hide this fact. Given this, constraints (3e) and (3f) tell us that should the firm successfully bribe its government, the total sum of transfers less the cost of pollution abatement in states 1 and 4 cannot be less than the corresponding total in states 2 and 3, respectively. Solving the SNGA's problem (3a) subject to (2b )- (2d) and (3b )-(3 f) , I can state Theorem 2: In the three-tiered hierarchy with government/firm collusion, the SNGA can implement the first-best lEA in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. This contract has the following features: To intuitively verify that the lEA described in Theorem 2 is indeed collusion proof, I have to show that constraints (2b)-(2d) and (3b)-(3f) are satisfied. By part (iv) of the theorem, we see
that constraints (2b) and (3 b) are satisfied. Because T 23 , T 32 , G 23 ' and G 32 do not enter the SNGA's welfare function or the government and the firm utility and payoff functions, they can be set by the SNGA so as to ensure strict inequality in (2c), (2d), (3c), and (3d). Thus, these four constraints are satisfied. Finally, by parts (i), (ii), and (iii) of the Theorem and the reliability assumptions PI > P2 andp4 > P3' we see that constraints (3e) and(3f) are satisfied. Thus, this lEA is collusion proof.
To intuitively check that the lEA described in Theorem 2 does indeed implement the first best, recall the definition of the first-best optimum from section 3b. First, note that by part (iv) of the Theorem, the government and the firm are both held to their reservation utility and payoff, respectively. Second, criterion (ii) of the definition is satisfied because part (i) of the lEA requires that pollution be abated at the first-best level in every state of nature. Finally, the fact that the lEA is Pareto efficient in every state follows from condition (v) of the Theorem.
If the SNGA does indeed offer the lEA with the characteristics described in Theorem 2, then its total monetary transfers cannot be altered by changing the government's report or the firm's level of pollution abatement. As a result, the SNGA can be sure that its monetary obligations will be those described in Theorem 2. This is so because the equilibrium lEA is collusion proof. Alternately put, the SNGA designs the best possible lEA from the set of feasible lEA's that are constrained to be collusion proof. Following the intuition of the previous section, the lEA described in Theorem 2 can be thought of as an incentive scheme which effectively places the governments and the firms in the two DCs in Prisoner's Dilemma games. By appropriately designing the "out-of-equilibrium" transfers, the SNGA is able to ensure that misrepresentation of private information does not pay.
In other words, truthful pollution abatement and truthful reporting constitute a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the games for the governments and the firms.
Theorem 2 says that like in the no-collusion case studied in the previous section, the SNGA can implement the first-best lEA in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, even when firms and governments in the two DCs collude to maximize the monetary transfers to be received from the SNGA. This is a strong result and it has two significant practical implications. First, this result tells us that the concerns of scholars, such as Krasner (l983a, 1983b) , who have argued that sovereignty substantially weakens the position ofSNGAs and hence the lEAs that such authorities may design, is misplaced. 17
By explicitly modeling the effects of sovereignty, i.e., by disallowing the possibility of monitoring and enforcement and by allowing for the possibility of collusion, I have shown that the SNGA's lack of monitoring and enforcement powers does not preclude it from designing the first-best lEA, i.e., the lEA it would design in the absence of any informational imperfections.
Second, the results of Theorems 1 and 2 greatly strengthen the case for designing lEAs, which have four common structural features. First, these lEAs are individually rational for the DC players, i.e., they satisfy certain participation constraints. Second, these lEAs are incentive compatible because they ensure that misrepresentation of private information by firms and governments is not profitable. 18 Third, these lEAs are collusion proof, i.e., they are immune to the existence of government/firm collusion in the individual DCs. Fourth, these lEAs involve relative performance evaluation. In an lEA with relative performance evaluation, very similar DCs (i) receive similar monetary transfers for participating in an lEA, and (ii) are held to similar pollution abatement standards. As a result, such lEAs are equitable and hence more likely to be acceptable to DCs from a political standpoint. 17Also see Batabyal (1996a) .
18The reader should note that incentive compatibility is a key feature of the lEA design problem faced by the SNGA. An incentive incompatible lEA would be oflittle interest because in such an lEA, there would be no conformity between the actions that are desired by the SNGA and the actions that are actually taken by governments and fIrms in the individual Des.
Conclusions
In this paper I analyzed the question of designing equitable lEAs for technologically similar DCs in an environment in which a SNGA' s ability to design contracts is limited by the effects of national sovereignty and by the existence of informational imperfections. In particular, I modeled the institutional setting for the underlying problem as a two-forked, three-tiered hierarchy, and then I studied the nature of optimal ex ante lEAs, both without and with collusion. Two general policy conclusions emerge.
First, because the SNGA can implement the first best lEA irrespective of whether there is collusion, in a practical setting, the lEA design question will depend fundamentally on the extent to which an SNGA can exploit similarities in the pollution abatement technologies of the various countries. If two given DCs are very similar technologically so that the pollution abatement technologies of firms are also very similar, then the abatement technology quality parameters, i.e.,
e
A and e B , are likely to be strongly and positively correlated. In the limiting case of perfect correlation, the SNGA can engage in relative performance evaluation to great effect.
Second, the monitoring and enforcement problem stemming from national sovereignty is not as much of an issue as some scholars would have us believe. As we have seen, the SNGA can get around this aspect of the problem by designing collusion-proof contracts. In this connection, once again, the more important issue concerns the similarities in the quality of the pollution abatement technologies of countries with which the SNGA is attempting to contract.
The analysis of this paper and those of Batabyal (l996b, 1996c) together provide considerable support for the view that lEAs are not inherently doomed due to a basic monitoring and enforcement problem stemming from national sovereignty. Indeed, as we have seen in this paper, there are a number of situations in which the contractually mandated pattern of pollution abatement is ideal, i.e. , first-best.
The line of research pursued in this paper can be extended in a number of different directions.
I suggest two possible extensions. First, examining the lEA design problem in a multiperiod setting will enable one to analyze issues such as credibility, commitment, and the possible gains from ongoing relationships. As noted by Parson (1993) I shall now proceed by means of six steps.
Step 1: The firm and the government participation constraints bind at the optimum.
Proof I have to show that ex i > 0, i = 1,2. Supposeal=O. Then(6)tellsusthat0 1 =-1,a contradiction. Suppose a 2 = O. Then (11) tells us that O 2 = -1, a contradiction. Hence,
Step 2: a: = 1 = a/, Vi.
Proof· The result follows upon a pairwise comparison of(1) and (5), (2) and (6), (3) and (7) and (4) and (8) .
• Step 6: The optimal lEA is Pareto efficient in all four states. 
